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INTRODUCTION
For many years, Louisiana’s coastal regions have been a point of
contention for property owners seeking to maintain their ownership rights
in a constantly changing landscape.1 Louisiana’s coast harbors rich natural
Copyright 2021, by ALEX LEJEUNE.
1. JIM WILKINS ET AL., PRELIMINARY OPTIONS FOR ESTABLISHING 
RECREATIONAL SERVITUDES FOR AQUATIC ACCESS OVER PRIVATE WATER
BOTTOMS 4 (Louisiana Sea Grant College Program, 2018), http://www.lasea
/A8LL-SYEV].
grant.org/wp-content/uploads/LSG-Coastal-Access-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc
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280 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
resources that offer many commercial opportunities for those with the
right to control them.2 The assets available on these lands make assertions
of ownership pervasive and frequent.3 Recently, conflicts between the
State of Louisiana and its coastal landowners have arose over who owns
the surface and mineral rights that accompany coastal lands and water
bottoms.4 
There are two major causes for this dispute: valid title and erosion. For
one, it is unclear who has valid title to these lands due to faulty land sales
by the State during the early 1800’s, which purportedly transferred some
public lands and water bottoms to private landowners.5 As a result, these
lands have multiple chains of title, making legal proceedings difficult
when both parties have strong claims for valid title.6 Secondly, natural and
artificial factors contributing to erosion of private, coastal land have
triggered many landowners to assert their ownership rights (against the
State) in any way they can. Some natural causes of erosion include
disturbances from natural disasters and rising sea levels, as well as
subsidence.7 Human activity also increases the rate of erosion through
2. William B. Richardson, 2017 Louisiana Summary: Agriculture and
Natural Resources, LSU AGCENTER (Aug. 10, 2018, 4:35 PM), https://www.lsu
agcenter.com/profiles/aiverson/articles/page1533918931356 [https://perma.cc/62
UM-2UQJ].
3. Christopher Flavelle, The Fighting Has Begun Over Who Owns Land
Drowned by Climate Change, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (April 25, 2018, 3:00 
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-04-25/fight-grows-over-
who-owns-real-estate-drowned-by-climate-change [https://perma.cc/RQ5Q-D6EL].
4. WILKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 3; see, e.g., Riceland Petroleum Co. v.
N. Am. Land Co., 869 So. 2d 894, 896 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004); see also State
v. Salt Domes P’ship, No. 72682, 2016 WL 3197529 (La. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15, 2016).
5. James G. Wilkins & Michael Wascom, The Public Trust Doctrine in 
Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 861, 872 (1992); see also LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR,
INVENTORY OF STATE LANDS 10 (2018), https://www.lla.la.gov/PublicReports.nsf/
2A4CDBD9DFB0BE58862582F000625135/$FILE/0001A476.pdf [https://perma
.cc/6PWY-9KYR].
6. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 11:10, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE at 2 (5th ed. 2015) (The word “title” has been used in Louisiana 
legislation and jurisprudence in at least three different senses. It may mean an act 
translative of ownership, such as a sale, donation, or exchange; it may mean an
instrument evidencing ownership or another real right, such as a partition or a
judgment; or it may simply mean ownership of a thing or a valid claim to a real 
right other than ownership).
7. Clare Davis-Wheeler, Louisiana Coastal Land Loss, TUL. UNIV. (Jan. 7, 
2000), http://www.tulane.edu/~bfleury/envirobio/enviroweb/LandLoss/LandLoss
.htm [https://perma.cc/46TX-BYM2]. (Subsidence is the general term for the
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activities such as dredging canals, building river-control structures like
dams and levees, and “over nourishing” wetlands with chemical pollutants
when drained.8 
Title disputes and erosion, in addition to the contradictory interests of
each party, have given rise to the issue of “dual-claimed” lands along
Louisiana’s coast.9 “Dual-claimed lands” are parcels of property to which
the State and coastal landowners both claim ownership.10 There are many
barriers keeping the parties from reaching a reasonable solution—mainly, 
poor communication and reluctance to negotiate.11 In attempting to reach 
a resolution, Louisiana’s property laws may also be seen as an
impediment. Louisiana law prohibits the severance of mineral rights from
surface rights in the same parcel of land—an action which could be
beneficial for negotiations.12 
While many common law states—such as Texas, North Dakota, and
Alaska—allow for severance via statutes that govern the property rights of
freehold estates and mineral conveyances, Louisiana does not.13 If the 
Louisiana legislature was to pass new statutes on property law similar to
those in common law jurisdictions, the State and coastal landowners would
have concrete legislative authority to assist them when conducting
negotiations and setting parameters. The conflict over dual-claimed lands
would likely benefit from the flexibility that comes with the different types
of ownership interests inherent in the common law system of mineral and
surface estates in land. Separate estates can create separate ownership
gradual sinking of coastal land into the ocean. It is one of the largest causes of
coastal land loss).
8. Id. (This process is known as eutrophication).
9. See generally LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 5, at 10 (The report
provides a map of southern Louisiana highlighting the extent of dual-claimed
lands).
10. Id. at 9.
11. Sara Sneath, As Louisiana’s Coast Washes Away, State Cashing in on




13. See generally Norken Corp. v. McGahan, 823 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1991);
see also Krenz v. XTO Energy, Inc., 890 N.W.2d 222, 237 (N.D. 2017); see also
Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v. City of Lubbock, 498 S.W.3d 53 (Tex. 2016) (These
states have been cited because they are among the top oil and gas producing
jurisdictions in the United States, along with Louisiana, and should be viewed as
good examples of strong mineral producing states that have operated well under
the common law property method of severing mineral rights via separate estates
in land).
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282 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
rights, which can then be apportioned in accordance with the specific
interests of either party in any given disputed parcel of land.14 Certainly,
revitalizing Louisiana’s property scheme to accommodate for common
law principles would require significant changes to the law.15 However,
the importance of the issue warrants some remedial actions, which will be
proposed infra.
Part I of this Comment explains the relevant constitutional provisions
and statutory law governing dual-claimed lands. This Part also addresses
the historical background and causes of dual-claimed lands, highlighting
the interests of each party fueling the current conflict. Part II identifies
some key differences between civil law property and common law
property and further states general property law principles provided by
early Louisiana cases. Part III of this Comment lays out the public policy
rationales behind Louisiana’s prohibition on severing mineral rights from
surface rights, while counter-arguments call into question the strength of
these policy concerns. Part IV of this Comment provides several solutions
in an attempt to resolve the dispute between the State and coastal
landowners over dual-claimed lands.
I. BACKGROUND
Louisiana Civil Code article 450 states, “[p]ublic things are owned by 
the state or its political subdivisions in their capacity as public persons.
Public things that belong to the state are such as running waters, the waters
and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the territorial sea, and the
seashore.”16 Thus, any analysis of water bottom ownership must begin
with the general premise that the State owns the beds of all navigable water
bodies within its borders.17 Additionally, Louisiana Civil Code article 477
defines ownership as a “right that confers . . . direct, immediate, and
exclusive authority over a thing. The owner of a thing may use, enjoy, and
dispose of it within the limits and under the conditions established by
14. David D. Haddock & Thomas D. Hall, The Impact of Making Rights
Inalienable: Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Texaco, Inc. v. Short, Fidelity
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, and Ridgway v. Ridgway, 2 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (1983).
15. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. IX §§ 3, 4; see also LA. REV. STAT. § 31:5
(2019).
16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2019).
17. Ryan M. Seidemann, Curious Corners of Louisiana Mineral Law:
Cemeteries, School Lands, Erosion, Accretion, and Other Oddities, 23 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 93, 118 (2009).
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2832021] COMMENT
law.”18 Therefore, if the State owns land or water bottoms that are
classified as public things, then ownership of that property comes with all
rights therein.19 
Ownership of the waters, bottoms, banks, and shores of waterbodies 
in Louisiana varies depending on the nature of the water body.20 Moreover,
it is well-established in Louisiana that the bottoms of navigable water
bodies are public things, inalienable by the State and insusceptible to
private ownership.21 Oftentimes, ownership of public or private things are
discussed in the context of who has the rights to natural resources in certain
immovable property. These general tenets of property law find their
authority under the Louisiana Constitution, which requires the reservation
of mineral rights, inter alia, by the State for all public lands.22 Louisiana
Constitution article IX section 3 mandates that “[the State] shall neither
alienate nor authorize the alienation of the bed of a navigable water
body.”23 Additionally, Louisiana Constitution article IX section 4 states
“the mineral rights on property sold by the state shall be reserved.”24 
These statutory articles read in conjunction with the Louisiana
Constitutional provisions provide some clear property foundations and
legal rules for the classification and reservation of state lands and water
bodies as “public things.” These principles seem to suggest that settling
disputes over property ownership can be done by a formulaic application
of statutory provisions depending on the nature of the water body.25 Some 
scholars have taken this view to be an inadequate resolutory method
because it is overly simplistic given the “peculiar geophysical conditions”
of coastal Louisiana.26 Louisiana’s coast regularly undergoes
topographical changes to the land as it is easily affected by sea-level
changes and coastal displacement activity.27 The current statutory law 
18. LA. CIV. CODE art. 477.
19. KATHY D. UNDERWOOD, LOUISIANA NOTARY HANDBOOK § 17:2,
Westlaw (2019–2020 ed.).
20. Judith Perhay, Louisiana Coastal Restoration: Challenges and
Controversies, 27 S.U. L. REV. 149, 162 (2000).
21. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY §§ 66–67, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 122–27 (3d ed. 1991).
22. LA. CONST. art. IX § 4.
23. LA. CONST. art. IX § 3.
24. LA. CONST. art. IX § 4.
25. Perhay, supra note 20, at 165.
26. Id. (These “peculiar conditions” refer to the often-rapid loss or gain of
land that is characteristic of Louisiana’s coast, making it an unusual, and indeed
difficult, landscape to apply property law to).
27. R. D. DeLaune et. al., Relationships among Vertical Accretion, Coastal
Submergence, and Erosion in a Louisiana Gulf Coast Marsh, 53 J. SEDIMENTARY
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284 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
seeks to classify, and then apportion ownership rights based on these
classifications. It is sensible to say that classification of a geographically
unstable area is largely susceptible to error. Louisiana’s coastal landscape
is seemingly too unpredictable for conventional solutions that rely on
statutory law.
A. Erosion as a Cause for Controversy in Dual-Claimed Lands
Louisiana’s coastal zone is constantly undergoing physical change.28 
What is land today might be open water tomorrow.29 The pervasiveness of
erosion along the coast has become one of the leading causes for the
dispute over dual-claimed lands.30 Ownership issues arise when privately
owned land adjacent to the coast subsides into the territorial sea (the Gulf
of Mexico) that is owned by the State.31 Naturally, erosion can occur along
almost any coast where tidal flow is present.32 However, subsidence is
certainly the natural phenomenon that has the strongest impact on private
land abutting the Gulf coast as rates increase and coastal landowners watch
their lands wash away.33 What was once a slow, gradual loss that could be
reasonably managed or accounted for by landowners has become a fast
and unpredictable threat to their property.34 However, the natural rate of
land loss does not compare to the impacts human activity has on erosion.35 
Human activity has accelerated erosion in several ways. This includes
the channelizing and leveeing of the Mississippi River basin, resulting in
the loss of land-building sediments and the deprivation of nutrients and
freshwater to adjacent wetlands.36 Wetland loss can alter the spatial
configuration of the landscape by reducing landscape connectivity and
PETROLOGY 147, 147 (1983) (coastal marshes are truly one of the most ephemeral
of physiographical features, as they occupy the narrow intertidal zone and are
therefore particularly susceptible to changes in the level of the oceans and in
coastal displacement activity).
28. Wilkins & Wascom, supra note 5, at 861 (1992).
29. Id.
30. WILKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 4 (Louisiana Sea Grant College Program,
2018).
31. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2019).
32. Keqi Zhang et al., Global Warming and Coastal Erosion, 64 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 41 (2004).
33. Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, 
Consequences, and Remedies, 58 TUL. L. REV. 3, 13 (1983).
34. Id. (The rate of subsidence over the last thousand years has occurred at a
rate 1.55mm per year and has increased to a current figure of 9mm per year).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 23.
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2852021] COMMENT
increasing isolation.37 Moreover, the dredging of canals across barrier
islands and through wetlands directly contributes to land loss.38 Private 
landowners, many of whom are oil and gas companies conducting mineral
exploration, and the State acting through the Army Corps of Engineers,
share the blame for these actions that have aggravated coastal land loss.39 
Nevertheless, private landowners and the State still argue over ownership
rights to these lands and water bottoms. The argument is expected to
intensify as erosion continues.40 
The legal effects resulting from coastal erosion are perhaps more
pertinent to the dual-claimed lands issue. According to Louisiana
jurisprudence, when riparian land becomes part of the bed of navigable
water body, regardless of whether it be a body of freshwater, the sea or an 
arm of the sea, it ceases to be susceptible of private ownership.41 The land
becomes a public thing, owned by the State in its capacity as a public
person.42 Thus, the language present in Louisiana Constitution article IX
sections 3 and 4, when combined with Louisiana Civil Code article 450,
presents a general, but clear rule: as land erodes into navigable water
bodies or the territorial sea, it becomes the property of the State, along
with its underlying minerals.43 Therefore, these minerals are not subject to 
alienation by the State.44 Based on this analysis, it is appropriate to say that
article 450 is the “heart of the controversy” over dual-claimed lands. This
is because as private lands erode into navigable water bodies (in
Louisiana’s case, the Gulf of Mexico) they are converted into public
property by operation of law.45 This application of article 450 is often the
means by which the State claims ownership over areas where coastal land
has turned open, navigable water.46 
37. Scott G. Leibowitz, Isolated Wetlands and Their Functions: An
Ecological Perspective 23 WETLANDS 517, 525 (2003).
38. Houck, supra note 33, at 23.
39. Id.
40. WILKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
41. Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 2d 315, 322 (La. 1936); see also Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576, 582–83 (La. 1974).
42. Miami Corp., 173 So. 2d at 322; see also Gulf Oil Corp., 317 So. 2d at
582.
43. Seidemann, supra note 17, at 142.
44. Id.
45. Miami Corp., 173 So. 2d at 322; see also Gulf Oil Corp., 317 So. 2d at
582–83.
46. Flavelle, supra note 3.
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286 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
B. Faulty Conveyances as a Cause for Controversy in Dual-Claimed
Lands
Despite the term’s frequent use in property law, the Louisiana Civil
Code does not specify what constitutes a valid or clear title other than its
reference as an “instrument.”47 Rather, “title” is used and explained more 
so in the context of other areas of the law that require it as an element for
causes of action such as acquisitive prescription or petitory actions.48 For 
example, Louisiana Civil Code article 3483 states that just title is a
juridical act, such as a sale, exchange, or donation, sufficient to transfer
ownership or another real right. The act must be written, valid in form, and
filed for public registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which
the immovable is situated.49 Furthermore, in an action to prove ownership
of immovable property by title, the claimant is required to prove an
unbroken chain of transfers dating back to the sovereign state when two
competing titles do not have a common, previous owner.50 
Many of the lands at issue first started out in the hands of the Louisiana
state government upon its admission into the union in 1812 under the equal
footing doctrine.51 The Federal Swamp Land Grants Acts of 1849 and 
1850 permitted the State to sell “swamp lands subject to overflow,” but
only after the area had been ascertained by surveys and recognized by the
State as land containing non-navigable water bodies. 52 
47. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1839 (2019).
48. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3483, 3653.
49. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3483.
50. PETER S. TITLE, LOUISIANA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 5:32, in 1 
LOUISIANA PRACTICE SERIES 122–27 (2d ed. 2019) (For example, a plaintiff in
petitory action against a defendant in possession can prove ownership in one of
three ways: title back to sovereign, title back to common author, or proof of
ownership by acquisitive prescription).
51. State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 58 So. 405, 407 (La. 1912) (“It is
evident, then, that the State of Louisiana did not acquire the soil here claimed,
which lies beneath the water of intercommunicating sounds, bayous, creeks,
channels, lakes, bays, coves, and inlets bordering upon the Gulf of Mexico and
within the ebb and flow of the tide, by virtue of the acts of Congress of 1849 and
1850, but that she acquired them, upon her admission into the union, by virtue of
her inherent sovereignty.”); see also YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 6, § 4:12, at 1.
52. Hall v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Bossier Levee Dist., 35 So. 976 (La. 1904)
(The federal Swamp Land Grants Acts of 1849 and 1850 made large amounts of
swampland and navigable water bodies that had overflowed land available for 
private ownership. Originally, the grants conveyed subdivisions of coastal land to
Louisiana under the acts of Congress, a large part of which were “swamp land
subject to overflow.” These lands were granted subject to disposal by the
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  291 2/25/21  8:41 AM





   
 
   
 









   
 
   
 








   
 
      
      
 
   
       
    
   
       
        
 
    
   
   
  
    
2872021] COMMENT
A great number of the subsequent land surveys conducted by the State
were done incorrectly.53 Some of the surveys classified large portions of
coastal land as mere swamp land (non-navigable) even though many of
these lands contained navigable water bodies.54 The process of selling 
these lands to private ownership was largely inexact due to the
unsophisticated surveying methods used at the time, causing confusion
over the ownership of some water bottoms and coastal land.55 Based on 
these miscalculated surveys, the State sold areas of land to private
individuals that included many public waterways and their water
bottoms.56 The State soon after became aware of its mistake and tried to
reassert title claims to land already sold.57 So began the issue of “dual-
claimed” water bottoms because private landowners claim these
conveyances were valid sales of non-navigable (and therefore private)
land.58 Indeed, many private parties asserting ownership of certain dual-
claimed lands can trace their title back to the sovereign, satisfying the
burden of proof for ownership.59 
Clear title currently does not exist for an estimated 286,467 acres of
water bottoms in Louisiana due to ambiguity regarding who has valid
title.60 This problem has already had negative effects, and will likely have
more, on private sellers and purchasers of coastal land who do not know
that they are actually purchasing State-claimed land.61 Furthermore, absent
an agreement between the parties, these disputed title claims can only be
resolved through the courts—meaning each contested parcel has to be
litigated separately.62 Extensive property litigation in this area could
Louisiana legislature. Under the act, shallow lakes and rivers, non-navigable,
could be sold after their area had been ascertained by surveys recognized by the
State).
53. WILKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
54. Id. (Swampland and overflowed lands are not generally considered to
have navigable water bodies, and therefore, are not definitively public things).
55. Id.
56. LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 5, at 10.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. TITLE, supra note 50, § 5:32, at 122–27.
60. LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 5, at 10 (This number only represents
lands physically surveyed).
61. Id. at 8 (“[T]hese properties could have been sold or transferred multiple
times since incorrectly being added to the parish tax rolls in the name of another
party, resulting in these parties being unaware that the property they bought in
good faith is also being claimed by the State”).
62. Id. at 10.
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288 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
potentially inundate the courts and be very expensive for all parties
involved.
The best illustration of the legal disputes over dual-claimed lands in
Louisiana is the case Stamper v. Bienville Parish Police Jury.63 Stamper
involved a title dispute over 2.52 acres in Bienville Parish.64 The
competing claimants, George Stamper and the State, were both able to 
trace their titles back to the sovereign.65 The State sold the plaintiff a plot
of land near the coast—one which was authorized to be sold by the State
under the Swamp Land Grants Acts—contiguous to a plot retained by the
Bienville Parish Police Jury.66 The issue concerned the property line
between the plots, which was later determined to be placed incorrectly in
reliance on inaccurate surveying by the State at the time of the sale.67 The 
Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the State did not
have title to the 2.52 acres of property, regardless of its contention that the
old property line labeled the State as owner.68 The court acknowledged
that “no hard and fast rule can be established [for resolving these issues],
based on the extent of discrepancy, or portion of omitted area [in the
original survey], that would be applicable to any and every case.”69 The
holding in this case was based on updated surveying that showed the
plaintiff Stamper was the true owner.70 
In a more recent case, Riceland Petroleum Co. v. North American
Land Co., a petroleum company filed a concursus proceeding to determine
the ownership of royalties owed under mineral leases affecting certain
lands in which ownership was disputed by the State of Louisiana and a
group of private parties.71 The State claimed ownership of the lands based
on boundary lines established by previous government survey and
accretion of the seashore.72 The disputed property was located in Cameron
Parish along the shore of the Gulf of Mexico.73 The plaintiff’s ancestor in
63. 153 So. 2d 503 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 504; TITLE, supra note 50, § 5:32, at 122–27 (Tracing back to the
sovereign is one of the ways to prove ownership in just title over immovable
property).
66. Stamper, 153 So. 2d at 504.
67. Id. at 508.
68. Id. at 509.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 507.
71. 869 So. 2d 894, 895 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004).
72. Riceland Petroleum, 869 So. 2d at 896.
73. Id.
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2892021] COMMENT
title bought the property from the State in 1883.74 The litigation concerned
a property line between contiguous parcels of land.75 Similarly, the issue
over the placement of property lines arose due to the same inaccurate
surveys conducted in the Stamper case.76 The plaintiff oil company filed 
suit for assertion of ownership, with the mineral rights of the property
being the main interest.77 The court stated the principle that “facts and 
circumstances may be examined, and if they affirmatively disclose an
intention to limit the grant to [the initial survey], then these must be treated
as definite boundaries.”78 The court found no such facts or circumstances
indicating that the State was the owner of the lands at the time of
conveyance in 1883, and rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff oil
company as owners.79 
These are just two of the more noteworthy cases that embody the
dispute over ownership of coastal land. A number of district court cases
have surfaced as well.80 However, these cases do not illustrate the different
interests that each party may have in these lands, nor what measures they
have taken to assert ownership other than filing suit, and are therefore, an 
incomplete picture of the dual-claimed lands issue.
C. The Interests and Actions of Both Parties
Conflicting interests in dual-claimed lands causes both parties to
compete for ownership in the absence of an agreement. Their actions
create considerable downstream effects, afflicting other groups such as
fishermen and mineral producers.81 Some of these effects include
restricted public access to these areas, negative economic impacts to the
State, and reduced revenue generating opportunities from natural resource
production for both parties.82 
74. Id.; YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 6, § 11:10, at 3 (The term “ancestor in
title” encompasses all previous owners of a parcel of real property).
75. Riceland Petroleum, 869 So. 2d at 896.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 898.
79. Id. at 903.
80. See State v. Salt Domes P’ship, No. 72682, 2016 WL 3197529 (La. Dist.
Ct. Jan. 15, 2016); see also Sid Mar's Rest. & Lounge, Inc. v. State, No. 632032,
2013 WL 9932953 (La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 09, 2013).
81. Sneath, supra note 11.
82. LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 5, at 11.
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One example of the negative impacts is that dual-claimed lands are
high-risk real estate for purchasers and investors.83 It is difficult for private
landowners to market property that is claimed by multiple owners.84 As
such, these properties exist in the shadow of litigation, making them risky 
investments for prospective purchasers who presumably wish to steer clear 
of title disputes.85 At its peak, this issue could potentially have the effect
of stifling the sale of these properties entirely if litigation becomes the
norm for resolving dual-claimed land disputes, and few purchasers would
have an incentive to buy.
Additionally, private landowners have become adamant about
restricting recreational access to water bottoms in an effort to assert their
claim to the natural resources underneath.86 This has caused landowners to 
use boundary markers extensively in coastal areas in an effort to claim
their land that has subsided into the Gulf of Mexico.87 Some private
landowners have even promulgated their own property maps by
employing land surveyors to set favorable property lines as a way to
maintain ownership. Given that the majority of land loss occurs on private
lands, it is rational for riparian owners to seek options that secure their
property and economic interests.88 
The dispute also causes fewer revenue generating opportunities for
both the State and private landowners.89 Oil exploration companies with
the right to explore are aware of the dual-claimed lands controversy, but
that does not hinder their attempts at obtaining natural resources to make
money. Thus, these companies must pay both the private landowner and 
the State for the rights to explore for oil on dual-claimed water bottoms
due to the title ambiguities previously described.90 It is reasonably
foreseeable that if one party, either the State or private landowner, received
mineral revenues at the exclusion of the other, the mineral producer could
face legal action from the excluded party who simultaneously claims that
they granted the mineral producer that right to explore. These additional
83. Id.
84. Id. (While the State of Louisiana and riparian owners are the two main
parties to these actions, oftentimes subsets of state government, like municipal
governments, state agencies, and non-profit organizations, will also claim
ownership of these properties via paid taxes. Multiple riparian owners have been
known to feud over the same dual-claimed properties also.).
85. Id.
86. Sneath, supra note 11.
87. WILKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
88. Id.
89. LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 5, at 11.
90. Id. at 12.
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2912021] COMMENT
costs may impede oil exploration efforts.91 Furthermore, the State is 
currently required to confer with the private landowners on how to divide
any royalty revenues from production on these dual-claimed water
bottoms, thus complicating the disbursement of dividends.92 Given that
each party is seeking to maximize their royalty profits during these
meetings while simultaneously involved in ownership disputes, the current
negotiation scheme is not ideal.
While the circumstances outlined above indicate some of the material
complications involved in the controversy over coastal lands, the
sentiments and interests underlying each party’s position deserve equal
attention for a clarification of what is at stake. The State and landowners
both have equally strong interests in the mineral rights that accompany
ownership of the land.93 For the State, royalties from mineral leases on
state-owned lands and water bottoms accounted for 6%–8% of the State’s
general fund, roughly $176 million dollars, in 2017.94 However,
Louisiana’s coast is 80% privately owned.95 From a financial standpoint, 
coastal landowners maintain a considerable hold on Louisiana’s natural
resources and have the potential to flourish financially in the private
market as a result.96 Since ownership of land comes with the mineral rights
therein, private owners are incentivized to fight more aggressively for the
title to their eroding land in order to maintain ownership of these mineral
rights.97 
There are several other notable interests outside of natural resources.
For example, the Louisiana government, through many different state 
agencies, is constantly undergoing restoration and conservation projects in
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See generally Seidemann, supra note 17.
94. EDWARD L. O’BRIEN, III, LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., LOUISIANA ENERGY
FACTS ANNUAL 2017, at 44 (2017), http://www.dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/TAD/
newsletters/energy_facts_annual/LEF_2017.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NP5-ZP
XZ].
95. Sara Sneath, How Louisiana Protects and Restores a Privately Owned
Coast, NOLA.COM (Oct. 3, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://www.nola.com/news/
environment/article_f5782233-62f0-59df-a9be-5ac89eb3787a.html [https://perm
a.cc/3J9Y-K9E2].
96. Flavelle, supra note 3 (“Louisiana’s reluctance to claim ownership of
submerged land is that officials are loath to antagonize coastal landowners, many
of which are the same oil and gas companies that are the core of the State’s
economy . . . . ‘The landowners are so freaking powerful.’”).
97. Id.
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292 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
order to combat Louisiana’s rapidly eroding coast.98 For this reason, the
State has a significant interest in obtaining title to dual-claimed lands so
that it may establish a right of access to these properties to assure that
future projects will not be interrupted or disturbed by private activity.99 
There are many causes of coastal erosion, but anthropogenic factors, like
oil and gas companies dredging thousands of miles of canals—in addition
to levees, dams, and general use of surface land for mineral exploration— 
play a large role in worsening the problem.100 If the State could exclude
private parties from surfaces by acquiring clear title, efforts to combat the
coastal erosion crisis might be more efficient.
Mineral rights are not the only compelling interest private owners have
in coastal land. Some owners seek income by monetizing additional types
of surface-based activity.101 Recognizing that mineral revenues are not the
only way to maximize the economic value of their land, many landowners
will charge for recreational use of their property.102 In the past,
participating landowners have: collected payments in exchange for
allowing the public temporary access for fishing tournaments, invested in
fishermen supply stores on their land, rented out their docks, and charged
for other general accesses consistent with the nature and use of their
property.103 Ecotourism—such as kayaking, fishing expeditions, and
wetland tours—has increased over the last decade, and coastal landowners
have expressed interest in taking advantage of the growing industry by
opening their properties and charging for use.104 
98. Stephen R. Barnes et al., Economic Evaluation of Coastal Land Loss in
Louisiana, 4 J. OCEAN & COASTAL ECON., June 2017, art. 3, at 1 (Louisiana has
experienced a rapid loss of land due to coastal erosion, amounting to
approximately 2,000 square miles over the last century. It is estimated that
Louisiana will experience additional land loss of over 1,750 square miles over the
next 50 years.).
99. Seidemann, supra note 17, at 141.
100. See Sneath, supra note 11. “Anthropogenic” means of, relating to, or
resulting from the influence of human beings on nature. Anthropogenic, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2020).
101. WILKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 11.
104. TOURISM ECON., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TOURISM IN LOUISIANA 16
(2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/tourism-economics/craft/Case-Studies-Docs/ 
2016-Louisiana-Tourism-Economic-Impact-April-2017-without-visitation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D8LY-56UH] (“Visitor spending in Louisiana has increased an
average of 4.6% each year since 2011, supported by continued growth in visits
from domestic tourists and visitors from abroad. Additionally, the tourism
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2932021] COMMENT
II. COMPARING LOUISIANA AND COMMON LAW PROPERTY
A. Louisiana Property Law
Louisiana property law has some unique civilian features that place
certain restrictions on an owner’s right to abusus, or the right to dispose.105 
Louisiana Constitution article IX sections 3 and 4 prohibit perpetual
alienations by the State of its water bottoms and mineral rights, meaning
the total relinquishment or transfer of absolute ownership.106 These
constitutional provisions do not have the effect of limiting the use of
mineral rights solely to the owner of the property. In fact, there are a
number of devices that could be implemented to allow use or possession
of mineral rights by another person separate from the use or possession of
the surface. A landowner may convey, reserve, or lease his right to explore
and develop his land for production of minerals and to reduce them to
possession.107 The three types of mineral interests that a person can convey
or receive are the mineral servitude, the mineral royalty, and the mineral
lease.108 Perhaps confusingly, Louisiana typically calls those who hold 
mineral servitudes, rights, or leases “owners,” even though they do not
truly own the minerals underneath a parcel of land.109 This usage is meant
to show that the right holder is the owner of a mineral interest itself, or is
the owner of the right to explore.110 Regardless, it is a misnomer.
The mineral servitude is the first type of interest, and perhaps the most
common.111 Only a landowner with the right to explore for and produce 
minerals may create a mineral servitude by conveying his right to enjoy
the land to another.112 This conveyance, however, does not amount to the
economy supported over 185,000 jobs, and state and local tax revenues from
visitor activity registered over 1.7 billion dollars in 2016.”).
105. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 67 So. 641, 645 (La. 1915) (“The
right to alienate is but one of the constituent elements of the right to dispose . . .
so may this right to alienate, a subdivision of the abusus, be, in turn, subdivided”).
106. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 6, § 9:28, at 1 (absolute ownership has three
elements: usus, fructus, and abusus, which are, respectively, the right to use, the
right to fruits of a thing, and the right to abuse, or alienate).
107. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:14 (2019).
108. Id. at § 31:15.
109. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 31:22 (2019); see also LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
art. 3669 (2019); see generally Cox v. Sanders, 421 So. 2d 869 (La. 1982).
110. See, e.g., Quality Envtl. Processes, Inc. v. IP Petroleum Co., 219 So. 3d
349, 374 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017).
111. Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV.
1097 (1987).
112. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:21, 31:24 (2019).
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  298 2/25/21  8:41 AM




   
  
   
  
 
     
 






   
   
  
   
 
     
 





    
      
       
      
       
    
 
     
       
      
 






     
     
294 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
creation of a separate mineral estate.113 What mineral servitudes illustrate
is the principle that owners may dismember or divide their ownership
rights by conveying their right to use and enjoyment.114 When this is done,
ownership is burdened by the imposing servitude as a charge upon the
land, the effect of which limits a landowner’s full capacity to exercise his
rights.115 However, these types of conveyances are not perpetual
alienations since mineral servitudes can be extinguished by prescription
resulting from non-use for ten years or by agreement of the parties.116 This
doctrine makes Louisiana unique among other mineral producing states
and distinguishes Louisiana from common law jurisdictions that treat this
type of conveyance as the creation of a separate mineral estate in land
subject to different ownership.117 
One who holds a mineral royalty has “the right to participate in
production of minerals on land owned by another, or land subject to a
mineral servitude.”118 A mineral royalty may be created by either a
landowner with mineral rights to the property, or by the owner of a
servitude.119 Mineral leases are contracts by which the lessee is granted the
right to explore for and produce minerals. This type of contract requires a
term and may be created by anyone with an executive right.120 Thus, it is
permissible under Louisiana law that a mineral holder, a royalty holder, or
even another mineral lessee may grant a lease—the last conveyance
constituting a mineral sublease.121 
These modes of conveyance are some of the frequently granted
mineral interests in Louisiana, although the list is not exhaustive.122 They 
113. Patrick H. Martin & J. Lanier Yeates, Louisiana and Texas Oil & Gas
Law: An Overview of the Differences, 52 LA. L. REV. 769, 804 (1992).
114. This constitutes a conveyance of the right to abusus. 
115. Martin & Yeates, supra note 113, at 786.
116. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:27 (2019).
117. David L. Pratt II, Severance vs. Servitude: Understanding the Differences
Between Texas and Louisiana Law Regarding Mineral Rights, 16 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 71, 72 (2009).
118. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:80.
119. KATHY D. UNDERWOOD, LOUISIANA NOTARY HANDBOOK § 19:7,
Westlaw (2019–2020 ed.).
120. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:105 cmt. b (2019); Wall v. Leger, 402 So. 2d
704, 710 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981) (“A mineral lease may be granted by the
landowner who owns the mineral rights, the mineral servitude owner, and the 
holder of executive rights over the mineral rights which he does not own; in other
words, any person having an ‘executive interest’ in the mineral rights on the
particular property may grant a mineral lease.”).
121. Wall, 402 So. 2d at 710.
122. Gueno v. Medlenka, 117 So. 2d 817, 822 (La. 1960).
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2952021] COMMENT
are noteworthy because they illustrate the principle that real property
owners have rights that are fluid or separable. The “bundle of rights” that
compose ownership are not totally insusceptible of division.123 
In addition, just as the State is prohibited from perpetually alienating 
its mineral rights in land, a similar prohibition is imposed on private
landowners.124 This area of substantive law refers to “solid minerals” as
opposed to the rights in them.125 Under Louisiana law, there is a statutory
prohibition against landowners severing their mineral rights and surface
rights.126 It states, “ownership of land includes all minerals occurring
naturally in a solid state. Solid minerals are insusceptible of ownership
apart from the land until reduced to possession.”127 Louisiana Mineral
Code article 5 acknowledges a landowner’s ownership interest in solid
minerals but imposes limitations on their right to alienate that interest.128 
This rule was first considered, and is still supported, by a string of
early cases dating back to the early 1900’s.129 In Frost-Johnson Lumber
Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, the court stated that, “it is the very essence of the
right of ownership that it cannot exist in two persons for the whole of the
same thing; but they may be the owners of the same thing in common, and
each for the part which he may have therein.”130 The Louisiana Supreme 
Court relied on policy reasons that prohibit alienation apart from title of
the surface, noting that it would be against public policy to allow the
formation of separate estates for surface rights and mineral rights in the
same parcel of land via alienation.131 Instead, the idea is that any
conveyance purporting to sell minerals as they naturally lie underneath the
surface, or “in place,” is not invalid but merely creates a right in the nature
of a servitude.132 
123. LA. CIV. CODE art. 477 (2019).
124. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:6 (2019).
125. Id. (Louisiana law does not recognize landowner right to ownership of
solid minerals lying underneath the land, but rather only the right to explore and
produce underlying minerals); see generally Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v.
Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207 (La. 1920).
126. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:5.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Frost-Johnson Lumber, 91 So. 207; Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co.,
97 So. 666 (La. 1923); Iberville Land Co. v. Texas Co., 128 So. 304 (La. Ct. App.
1st Cir. 1930).
130. Frost-Johnson Lumber, 91 So. at 211.
131. Id. at 243.
132. Id. at 215.
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296 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
In Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court
examined the question presented in Frost-Johnson regarding whether
separate estates are legally possible in Louisiana.133 The court affirmed the
Frost-Johnson ruling that permanent severance of oil and gas, or solid
minerals, is not permitted.134 Furthermore, the court declared that the
entire concept of separate mineral estates is completely foreign to the
fundamental principles of our civilian property system.135 According to the
court, there is no basis in statutory law or jurisprudence that allows for
mineral estates distinct from and independent of the surface estate.136 
Accordingly, these mineral rights acquired or severed are mere servitudes
upon land granting only the right to extract such minerals. The court
concluded that under Louisiana’s property regime, a land’s surface and
minerals underneath can never be considered “independent planes”
capable of independent ownership.137 
B. Common Law Property
While Louisiana does not permit the creation of separate estates in
land, common law states have a different property regime.138 For most
other oil and gas producing states, permanent severance of mineral rights
from surface rights is not prohibited. This is because in common law
jurisdictions, the concept of separate estates is fundamental.139 For 
example, in Texas, the surface and mineral interests in land are not
considered accessories to ownership of the land, but are in fact ownership
interests themselves.140 Thus, the mineral estate may be severed from the
surface estate by a grant of the minerals to another person via deed or lease,
or by reserving them in a conveyance.141 Each estate can be held by a
133. Wemple, 97 So. at 667.
134. Id. at 668–69.
135. Id. at 667.
136. Id.
137. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:5 cmt. b (2019); see also Iberville Land Co. v.
Tex. Co., 128 So. 304 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1930) (an agreement purporting to
create two different land estates on the same property was considered to be a
“legal impossibility”).
138. Pratt, supra note 117, at 74.
139. Martin & Yeates, supra note 113, at 775.
140. Aery v. Hoskins, Inc., 493 S.W.3d 684, 699 (Tex. App. 2016).
141. Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984); see also
Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 304 (1943) (“The owner of the entire estate in
land may convey the minerals therein separately from the surface. Conversely he
may convey the surface separately from the minerals. Stated in another way: The
owner has the right to sever his land into two estates, and he may dispose of the
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different owner. As that may be, the mineral estate is part of the respective
land where it exists.142 It cannot be physically separated from the land 
which it originates and derives its source from.143 The traditional
classification places upon these two estates, “mineral” and “surface,” a
status of dominant and servient respectively.144 It makes sense that the
surface estate is servient and the mineral estate is dominant because a
landowner who wishes to exercise his right to mine or drill for minerals
would need to have some sort of surface access—be that the surface owner
directly above, or a neighboring owner’s land.
Similarly, North Dakota’s property system resembles Texas involving
separate estates in land. A mineral estate may be separated from the
surface estate, and ownership of the mineral estate may exist separately
and distinctly from the surface estate.145 Severance occurs by a 
conveyance, reservation, or exception of the mines and minerals.146 When
a mineral estate is severed from the surface estate, the former is dominant
and the latter is servient in that the law implies a mineral estate’s inherent
right to access the surface in order to find and develop minerals.147 Thus, 
the surface estate is servient in the sense that it is charged with an easement
for the mineral estate’s exercise of its rights.148 These same concepts are
fundamental in the property law of Alaska, Utah, and Oklahoma.149 
C. Similarities and Differences Between Civil and Common Law
The civil and common law have some similar terminology in the
context of servitudes and easements—namely, the use of the terms servient
mineral estate and retain the surface, or he may dispose of the surface estate and
retain the minerals.”).
142. Harris, 176 S.W.2d at 304; see also Aery, 493 S.W.3d at 699.
143. Harris, 176 S.W.2d at 304; see also Aery, 493 S.W.3d at 699.
144. Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v. City of Lubbock, 498 S.W.3d 53, 62 (Tex.
2016) (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 817 (Tex. 1972)) (“This
court has led the way in working out accommodations which preserve unto the
severed mineral owner a dominant easement for the production of his minerals
while at the same time preserving a viable servient estate.”) (emphasis added).
145. Burlington N., Inc. v. Hall, 322 N.W.2d 233, 240 (N.D. 1982).
146. Id.
147. Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 135 (N.D. 1979).
148. Id.
149. See Norken Corp. v. McGahan, 823 P.2d 622, 628 (Alaska 1991); see
also Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co. v. Carbon Cty., 535 P.2d 1139, 1140 
(Utah 1975); see generally Turley v. Flag-Redfern Oil Co., 782 P.2d 130 (Okla.
1989).
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298 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
and dominant estates.150 However, a major difference between the
common law mineral estate and the civil law mineral servitude has to do
with the landowner’s rights to the minerals themselves. For example,
under Texas law, the minerals in place under the land are part of the land
itself.151 They are subject to ownership in the same manner as the land.152 
This is known as a corporeal right.153 Thus, when mineral rights are 
severed or alienated, the mineral estate is an estate in the land itself.154 In
Louisiana, landowners are not vested with ownership rights to the minerals
themselves, but rather ownership of the right to explore and produce.155 
This is an incorporeal right.156 Thus, any conveyance of mineral rights 
creates a mineral servitude consisting of the right to explore, and fugacious
minerals—such as natural gas or oil—are only technically severed when
reduced to possession.157 Solid minerals like coal and copper are also 
insusceptible of ownership apart from the land until reduced to
possession.158 
The most significant legal consequence of a mineral servitude
classification is that, unlike a mineral estate, which can be created in
perpetuity with no obligation on the owner to use his rights, a servitude is
subject to prescription for non-use of ten years.159 The rationale behind 
prescriptive periods is to encourage landowners to use and maintain their
land.160 Common law jurisdictions reject this rationale and therefore do
not have a rule of prescription for non-use because severing mineral rights
from surface rights creates independent rights for different persons in the
land estate itself. With the exception of adverse possession, ownership, as
an abstract concept governing a person’s “bundle of rights,” is
insusceptible of prescription.161 The civil law embodies classical Roman 
property concepts of absolute dominion over land, while common law
150. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 646 (2019).
151. Martin & Yeates, supra note 113, at 802.
152. Id.
153. Id. (corporeal rights are real rights in tangible property).
154. Id.
155. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:6 (2019).
156. Martin & Yeates, supra note 113, at 802 (incorporeal rights are personal
rights in a thing that has no body, but are comprehended by understanding); LA.
CIV. CODE art 461 (2019); see LA. CIV. CODE art. 470.
157. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:6 (possession here means establishing some type of 
physical control or dominion over the fugacious mineral); see also LA. REV. STAT.
§ 31:7.
158. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:5.
159. McDougal, supra note 111, at 1099.
160. Pratt, supra note 117, at 74.
161. Martin & Yeates, supra note 113, at 804.
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2992021] COMMENT
invokes more fragmented notions of property.162 These concepts and 
notions are rooted in historical public policies—some of which are still
solid foundations for the legal rules in place today, while others might be
outdated.163 
III. PUBLIC POLICY—LOUISIANA’S SUPPORT FOR ITS CIVILIAN 
PROPERTY SYSTEM
Adherence to a civil property system is not the sole justification for
preventing the severance of mineral rights from surface rights. As
previously described, there are historical justifications also.164 A number
of other policy rationales suggest that the prohibition is more extensive.
For example, as it concerns the State as a party, the constitutional
restrictions on the State’s ability to sever the mineral rights in its property
are rooted in abstract notions concerned with protecting the public
interest.165 The idea is that by requiring the State to reserve all mineral
rights and preventing immediate transfer of title to water bottoms or other
state lands, valuable state assets can be reserved for future generations and
used for current citizens of our state.166 This concept refers to the Public 
Trust Doctrine.167 Courts have also noted that it prevents the elite few with
inside knowledge or control over the market from wasting these assets and
profiting from the lost opportunity of people to benefit from natural
resource revenue.168 
162. Id. at 783.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. American Lung Ass’n of La., Inc. v. State Mineral Bd., 507 So. 2d 184,
188 (La. 1987).
166. Id.
167. Wilkins & Wascom, supra note 5, at 862 (quoting COASTAL STATES
ORG., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 3–4 (1990)) (“The Public
Trust Doctrine provides that public trust lands, waters and living resources in a
State are held by the State in trust for the benefit of all of the people, and
establishes the right of the public to fully enjoy public trust lands, waters and
living resources for a wide variety of recognized public uses. The Public Trust
Doctrine is applicable whenever navigable waters or the lands beneath are altered,
developed, conveyed, or otherwise managed or preserved. . . . It also sets 
limitations on the States, the public, and private owners, as well as establishing
duties and responsibilities of the States when managing these public trust assets.
The Public Trust Doctrine has been recognized and affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court, the lower federal courts and State courts from the beginning days
of this country to the present.”).
168. American Lung Ass’n, 507 So. 2d at 190.
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300 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
Indeed, the State brings in a great deal of money from mineral leases
and royalties each year.169 Those funds can go towards public institutions 
like roads and schools.170 If most or all of Louisiana’s rights to the natural
resources in public lands were permanently sold, Louisianans would likely
lose out on funds that could potentially be used for the improvement of
public institutions and services. However, this policy rationale is
questionable in light of constitutional provisions concerning the
government’s duties in regulating the use of our natural resources. 
The State is required to be a prudent administrator of public resources
and land held in public trust so as to be “consistent with the health, safety, 
and welfare of the people.”171 To say the State would frivolously sell away
a majority of its natural resource rights in public land would be to overlook
the State’s ability to make affluent decisions with its resources—decisions
that could improve the overall welfare of Louisiana. Furthermore, the State
has a duty to put the public’s interests first and support the protection and
conservation of natural resources under the Louisiana Constitution.172 
From a purely economic standpoint, the State will likely always have
an incentive to maintain ownership of public lands and the rights therein
for purposes of generating revenue. Although, as a practical matter, there
are few safeguards preventing the State from exhausting mineral interests
in favor of short-term gains.173 However, economic data suggests that
169. For example, during the fiscal year of 2012, mineral lease revenue
generated over 646 million dollars for Louisiana. LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, MINERAL
LEASE ROYALTY RATES 1 (2013), https://www.lla.la.gov/PublicReports.nsf/ 
DB918AD8E33411F286257B490074B82A/$FILE/00031C97.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JKK5-PHXS].
170. Louisiana State Budget and Finances, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Louisiana_state_budget_and_finances (last visited Sept. 
12, 2020) [https://perma.cc/SG26-SQD3].
171. LA. CONST. art. IX § 1 (The article fully states: “The natural resources of
the state, including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic 
quality of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar
as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The
legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy.”).
172. LA. REV. STAT. § 42:1101(B) (2019) (This statute is a general declaration
of government duty laid out in the Code of Governmental Ethics, as mandated by
Louisiana Constitution article X section 21); Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana 
Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1157 (La. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. § 
30:546 (The Natural Resources and Energy Act of 1973 is a good example of the
State legislature fulfilling its duty in compliance with Louisiana Constitution
article IX section 1).
173. T. Michael French, Develop a Meaningful National Energy Policy, ST.
OF LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES (Jan. 13, 1995),
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while State mineral producers might bear costs for resource and
environmental temperance in the short-term, the benefits of natural
resource production accumulate by conservative use over time.174 Among
these benefits are consistent market participation and stability.175 Perhaps 
market stability is attributable, in part, to the prohibition against alienation
that almost forces Louisiana to have supply. Either way, the economic data
shows that Louisiana’s best investment (which should influence decision-
making) still rests in favor of longevity in the sale and use of its natural
resources, regardless of whether the prohibition on alienation is in effect
or not.176 Louisiana has a legitimate interest in handling its resources
conservatively given that mineral revenues spur the State’s economy as
one of the largest natural resource providers in the United States.177 
As it pertains to both private and public landowners, another policy
reason supported by scholars and practitioners is that it is wise to keep
control of all interests and rights in land as closely in the hands of the
surface owner as possible.178 Having separate mineral estates can lead to
very complex chains of title in one piece of land; some of which are
destined to have defects.179 Less confusion and greater clarity as to who 
has rights to what and where (in the same piece of land no less) would
likely prevent excessive litigation. The absence of separate estates in land 
further supports simplicity in our property system in that there are not
multiple owners for different pieces of property, each having the power to
assert any rights of action connected to ownership.180 One can imagine the
http://www.dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=194
[https://perma.cc/U466-4DHC].
174. Mei-Jane Teng et al., ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENT AND ECONOMIC





177. Louisiana – State Energy Profile Analysis, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.php?sid=LA (last updated Mar. 19, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/5CL9-NZUS].
178. George W. Hardy III, Public Policy and Terminability of Mineral Rights
in Louisiana, 26 LA. L. REV. 731 (1966).
179. Patrick J. Rohan, Title Insurance, Deeds, Binders, Brokers and Beyond, 
N.Y. ST. B.J 49, 57 (2000).
180. Martin & Yeates, supra note 113, at 783. (“In Louisiana, with its simpler
allodial land holding system, the introduction of law that imported the antiquated
feudal doctrine of tenures was unacceptable. In the early 1800's real property
under Louisiana law could be contrasted for its simplicity, unity, precision and
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302 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
legal complexity of partitioning a parcel of land that has multiple co-
owners, or owners in indivision, for the surface and subsurface.181 This is
a legitimate public interest for clear title assessment purposes. It is difficult
to say that a title system free of complexities should be foregone in favor
of expanding ownership rights.182 
This policy rationale makes a great deal of sense. Perhaps it is the case
that separate estates would overly complicate the title process and hinder
the efficiency of mineral production with lawsuits. Simplicity, in this
respect, might be viewed as a stand-apart value of the civilian system that
makes it arguably more efficient than common law systems.183 Just 
because Louisiana’s substantive law is the minority view in the United
States is not necessarily a reason to conform to the legal theories or
practices of the rest of the country. Given the general difficulty in
determining valid title in Louisiana already, a little unity for ownership
rights certainly would not hurt.
It is also argued that preventing the perpetual alienation of mineral
rights is conducive to overall mineral transactions and development.184 
Purportedly, limiting the capacity to alienate encourages mineral
development by forcing those who have mineral servitudes or leases to
either use them or lose them.185 However, this is an inadequate basis for
objection. For one, other oil producing states who permit perpetual
alienation have surpassed Louisiana in production without having to
impose the prospect of losing the right to produce minerals by prescription
of 10 years for non-use.186 Natural resources are currently the second
largest commodity in the world, behind data.187 The “use it, or lose it”
clearness with the intricacy, complexity, uncertainty and indistinctness of the law 
of real property prevailing in common law America of the same period.”)
181. LA. CIV. CODE art. 797 (2019).
182. Hardy, supra note 178, at 744 (it is thought that this reasoning was the
main factor for the court’s holding in Frost-Johnson).
183. Martin & Yeates, supra note 113, at 783.
184. Hardy, supra note 178, at 741.
185. Id. at 742. Recall that mineral servitudes, royalties, and leases are subject
to a 10-year prescriptive period for non-use.
186. U.S. States – Rankings: Crude Oil Production, June 2020, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/state/rankings/#/series/46 [https://perma.cc/
SE47-BRMA] (last visited Oct. 7, 2020).
187. Chuck Kowalski, What Are the Most Actively Traded Commodities? THE 
BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/the-most-actively-traded-commodities-
809314 [https://perma.cc/92FM-H5WH] (last updated Sept. 11, 2020); see also
The World’s Most Valuable Resource is No Longer Oil, But Data, THE 
ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-
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3032021] COMMENT
rationale behind the 10-year prescription for non-use is unnecessary for
commodities such as oil or natural gas that have such secure international
and domestic markets.188 The competitive nature of the oil and gas industry
clearly indicates that non-use should not be a concern, and further, is not
a valid argument for preventing the perpetual alienation of mineral rights
or adopting a separate estates approach. Opponents of the civilian system
suggest that “it is the presence of mineral resources, rather than a mineral
property system limiting the right of alienation, that is the strongest factor
in securing development.”189 
Overall, the civilian approach does have some favorable policy
reasons underlying its property law. However, there are holes in the
reasoning of many arguments supporting the current standards that
regulate real estate and resources in Louisiana. The weaker policy
arguments surmount the stronger, and it would be advantageous if the laws
in place were based on more sound principles that reflect the interests and
practices of the mineral market that they govern.
IV. LEGAL SOLUTIONS
A. The Need to Negotiate
As stated, Louisiana does not allow landowners to sever minerals
rights from the surface rights in land. This is blackletter law. 190 But 
blackletter law in this instance overlooks the policy question of whether
Louisiana should allow severance. Coastal landowners are quickly losing
land, while simultaneously caught up in ownership disputes over property
they purchased in good faith.191 Excluding private landowner concerns in
order to appeal to blackletter law would be an unjust resolution. As it
concerns erosion as a cause, one cannot expect coastal landowners to
simply sit back and watch their land wash away. Nor should they be
worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data [https://perma.cc/U9K
C-LH24].
188. INT’L MONETARY FUND, FISCAL TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE:
INTEGRATION OF NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ISSUES 13 (Jan. 2019),
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/PP/2019/pp122818fiscal-transp
arency-initiative-integration-of-natural-resource-management-issues.ashx [https:
//perma.cc/W8QL-8A9M] (The graph on page 13 of the report provides the 
average international resource revenues for 2016, as well as price indices).
189. Hardy, supra note 178, at 742–43.
190. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:5 (2019).
191. LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 5, at 10; see also Barnes et al., supra
note 98, at 1.
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304 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
expected to not argue for holding the State accountable for its careless
conveyances, which, as it may be recalled, is what initially started the
conflict.192 Coastal landowners are already at odds with the State in
seeking to protect their ownership rights in these dual-claimed lands.193 
Thus, as subsidence increases, so too will the conflict between the State
and coastal landowners.
On the other hand, it may be that appealing to blackletter law and
merely acknowledging its carelessness in past conveyances, without
recompense, ultimately advances larger objectives for Louisiana—like
further economic opportunities from a greater supply of property and
resources—that are more important than the concerns of coastal owners.
After all, it seems that the State only stands to benefit from this issue in
that it is obtaining new found mineral rights in land-turned-water-bottom, 
free of cost via natural processes like erosion.194 Indeed, the State could
potentially drag out discussions and wait for private lands to be so far
removed from the coast that the property indisputably becomes owned by
the State through operation of law.195 However, this is not a reasonable nor
responsible plan of action.
Louisiana law declares that the right of ownership is absolute.196 
However, ownership can be misused in certain circumstances.197 For 
instance, Louisiana Civil Code article 667 illustrates the principle that an 
owner is not allowed to assert his rights to the extent that they infringe
upon the rights of another.198 This is largely a question of degree.199 While 
192. See WILKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
193. Flavelle, supra note 3.
194. LA. CIV. CODE art 450 (2019).
195. This concern assumes that it likely becomes more difficult for coastal
landowners to assert ownership over land the further they subside into the Gulf.
Naturally, claims to ownership over submerged land that is 100 feet out from the 
coastline would be impractical.
196. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 477 (2019); see also id., cmt. b.
197. PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 3:28, in 4 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (4th
ed. 2019).
198. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 667 (1996) (The first sentence of the article
states, “Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he
cannot make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of
enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him.”).
199. A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 3:28, in 4 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE at 1 (4th ed. 2013) (“Whether acts, constructions, or
activities constitute an abuse of the right of ownership sufficient to justify
injunctive relief is ‘not to be decided by the application of any broad or inflexible
rule, but by a careful weighing of all the circumstances attending them by 
diagnosing them.’”).
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3052021] COMMENT
the State’s failure to take preventative measures in restoring or combating
coastal erosion may not constitute any particular action under article 667
that abuses its ownership rights in subsided lands or water bottoms,
inaction in this respect may be legally actionable.
In Wilson v. City of Baton Rouge, plaintiff landowners sued the local
government for failing to take steps to alleviate erosion of a drainage canal
that abutted their property, causing the plaintiffs to lose acreage.200 
Plaintiffs set forth claims for both negligence and strict liability under
Louisiana Civil Code article 667.201 The trial court granted relief to the 
plaintiffs on the basis that the State was liable for its failure to act, but the
First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the district court’s ruling on grounds
of prescription.202 While the First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed on the
prescription issue, the plaintiff’s underlying argument was not
overturned.203 Based on the reasoning of the trial court’s decision in
Wilson, it is possible for inaction in combating erosion to be a sufficient
basis for State liability in damage to private property. It may be a stretch
to equate liability in this sense to an “abuse of ownership rights,” but
Wilson serves as a good example of the State’s duty to combat erosion and
the consequences of it failing to perform that duty.204 Thus, the State may
not be able to sit by and allow private land and its mineral rights to subside
into State ownership by way of natural forces.
Second, this controversy is hindering resource production and
commerce.205 Dual ownership means dual royalty payments, which lessens
the incentive for producers to sign mineral leases.206 Generally speaking, 
easily operated resource production is good for commerce. Ownership
disputes complicate this process. Both the State and coastal landowners
have an interest in resolving the conflict in a manner that is beneficial for
both parties so as to avoid further strife over these lands and water
bottoms, or else both stand to lose out on large streams of revenue for the
private market and Louisiana’s state funds. As erosion worsens, the
implications of letting the dispute go on unresolved create very real and
200. Wilson v. City of Baton Rouge, 683 So. 2d 382, 383 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 1996).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 386.
203. Id.
204. See LA. CONST. art. IX § 1 (For the proposition that the State has a duty
to combat coastal erosion evidenced by the language “shall be protected,
conserved, and replenished.”) (emphasis added).
205. LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 5, at 11.
206. Id. at 12.
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306 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
practical problems.207 Overall, both the State and coastal landowners need
to be willing to meet in the middle. Given the already depleting lands of
the coastal environment, as well as the potential for significant monetary 
losses and litigation, strong incentives exist for both parties to find
common ground. As such, it is likely that future discussions and
negotiations would benefit from the alternatives that common law rules on
separate estates have to offer.
B. Adopting the Common Law Approach
Accepting the common law rules permitting landowners to sever their
mineral rights from surface rights would likely help compromises for dual-
claimed lands in Louisiana. Providing a legal mechanism that allows for
separate perpetual rights in both the surface and minerals would be a
strong incentive for both parties to reach an agreement. Both parties could
receive total control over the portion of land that best suits their interests.
In some cases, both the State and coastal landowners may have the same
interest, likely in mineral rights, and would not be served well by settling
for surface rights. This is a reasonable consideration. However, the
purpose of this Section of the Comment is not to provide universal
solutions for every competing interest, but rather options for settlement 
negotiations. In adopting the law of separate estates, the concept of
ownership rights in land can expand, and hopefully avoid the “all or
nothing” approach to ownership under Louisiana law that aggravates these
property disputes. To allow the current modes of conveyance to exist
exclusively—namely, the mineral servitude, royalty, and lease—would be
to permit the continual characterization of our property system by a basic 
group of terminable interests in minerals.208 
For certain purposes, the current modes of conveyance are sufficient
if an owner has the desire to keep close control over his ownership rights
by limiting their uses to other people with a term or default scenario or
reversion.209 However, the classification of all mineral interests as
terminable limits those owners who wish to engage in mineral transactions
that convey perpetual rights. A landowner may wish to undergo this kind
of conveyance in order to limit tax liability, or perhaps in certain
circumstances, a perpetual transfer of mineral rights may be more valuable
207. See Sneath, supra note 11.
208. Hardy, supra note 178, at 733. Many people would not like settling for a
couple squares of a Hershey’s bar, but give them half, and the conversation
suddenly goes smoother.
209. Id.
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3072021] COMMENT
than the granting of a lease or servitude.210 It may be the case that there are 
not many landowners, or the State for that matter, who wish to convey 
absolute ownership—in other words, that the need simply is not enough to
warrant a change in the law. Nevertheless, it is desirable to consider the
benefits that come with adopting less restrictive common law methods.211 
It is arguable that terminable interests are precisely what Louisiana’s
civilian system contemplates for purposes of promoting the timely and
careful use of natural resources. However, as previously argued,
production and use concerns are less important in the natural resource
industry, which is notoriously competitive.212 Undoubtedly, minerals will
be sought after and produced in Louisiana for the foreseeable future as
demand for these products continues. This policy rationale for regulating
natural resource use does not fare well when compared against the benefits
of giving landowners more power over alienation of their own rights. The
rationale fares even worse in the context of dual-claimed lands where
granting owners more power over their right to alienate would be
beneficial to appeasing the conflict. The idea is that by permitting
severance of mineral rights from surface rights, the parties will have more
personalized options, and solutions could be made that are tailored to the
parties’ specific interests.
Encouraging negotiation by expanding the right to alienate would
require amending the Louisiana Constitution in order for the State to be
able to bargain with private landowners. One suggestion is an amendment
repealing article IX section 4, which would require a joint resolution 
proposing the amendment, placement of the amendment on a statewide
ballot, an approval via simple majority by both houses of the Louisiana
State Legislature, and a majority of voters in the statewide ballot.213 The
amendment would have the effect of removing article IX section 4
entirely. If amended as such, the State would not be required to reserve
210. LA. CONST. art. VI § 26 (The rate of taxes for real property is a product
of assessed value multiplied by the millage rate (15%) set by the parish or
municipality, or both, depending on where the property is located. If a landowner
was to separate his land into estates with another owner, the other would be
entitled to pay his portion of the millage rate and the original landowner could
essentially decrease his property tax payments by one-half, or more if there are
multiple owners of the mineral estate).
211. Hardy, supra note 178, at 733.
212. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 188, at 13 (The graph on page 13 of
the report provides the average international resource revenues for 2016, as well 
as price indices.).
213. LA. CONST. art XIII § 1(A)(1) (The article provides an in-depth discussion
of the constitutional amendment procedure.).
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308 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
any mineral rights for sales of State-owned property to private landowners.
The goal of this amendment would be to do away with the State’s 
restriction on alienating mineral rights so that the State could actually
execute sales or exchanges of mineral rights if it wanted, and in the context
of dual-claimed lands, with an eye toward the creation of separate estates.
Perhaps getting rid of an entire constitutional provision would be an
overly burdensome, or even extreme, alteration to the Louisiana 
Constitution in light of the implications it would have on property law.214 
Alternatively, Louisiana Constitution article IX section 4(C) lists an
exception to the reservation requirement in paragraph (A).215 It states:
The legislature by act may direct the appropriate parish authority
in Terrebonne Parish to transfer title and ownership as to certain
lands . . . which due to an error in the original government survey
completed around 1838 . . . to those persons who have possessed
the property under good faith and just title for a minimum of ten
years or to those who have acquired from them, reserving the
mineral rights as just and sole compensation for the transfer.216 
These transfers in paragraph (C) conveyed title and ownership of the
mineral rights separate from the land, which was susceptible of further
conveyance.217 Under the circumstances defined in paragraph (C),
transferring mineral rights in sold land was intended to resolve ancient
survey errors by the State.218 Interestingly, this exception to the rule in
paragraph (A)—requiring the reservation of mineral rights—addresses the
exact same title issue causing disputes between the State and coastal 
landowners. However, this exception is limited only to certain persons
within Terrebonne Parish who satisfy the requirements of paragraph (C),
214. For example, allowing the State to sever its mineral rights and create
separate estates would cause property confusion in that some lands would have
multiple estates (and likely multiple owners for the estates) while some lands
would continue to have one owner and mineral interest holder. In the context of
boundary disputes, for example, the clash of owners asserting old law versus new
law could be very problematic for the courts.
215. LA. CONST. ANN. art. IX § 4(C).
216. Id.
217. See id., editor’s and revisor’s notes.
218. See id.
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and not the rest of the State.219 This is likely due to the fact that a majority
of dual-claimed lands are in Terrebonne Parish.220 
Hence, it appears that the Louisiana Constitution already contains an
exception to article IX section 4 that addresses dual-claimed lands.221 The 
existence of this exception suggests that it would be a reasonable solution
to amend the Louisiana Constitution with another exception that permits
the State to perpetually transfer mineral rights, thereby severing mineral
rights from surface rights, for purposes of resolving dual-claimed land
disputes. This new exception might avoid some of the concerns over
repealing article IX section 4 by limiting the scope of the amendment’s
application. Thus, the common law rule of separate estates can be put to
good use for dual-claimed lands without becoming a fundamental
characteristic of our property system. However, dual-claimed land
disputes are not limited to Terrebonne Parish; they are increasingly
prevalent throughout coastal Louisiana.222 The new amendment should be
fashioned so as to expand the exception in paragraph (C) for severance of
mineral rights in state lands to include all parishes.
The amendment would simply delete the Terrebonne Parish reference
and all adjoining references to specific plots of land.223 The new 
219. Paragraph (C) states: 
The legislature by act may direct the appropriate parish authority in
Terrebonne Parish to transfer title and ownership as to certain lands near
Bayou Dularge in Section 16 of Township 20 South, Range 16 East,
which due to an error in the original governmental survey completed
around 1838 until recently were thought to be within Section 9, to those 
persons who have possessed the property under good faith and just title
for a minimum of ten years or to those who have acquired from them,
reserving the mineral rights as just and sole compensation for the
transfer. Consistent with the provisions of Article XIII, Section 3, the
notice requirements of Article III, Section 13 are satisfied for an act
passed as a companion to the act setting forth this Paragraph.
LA. CONST. ANN. art. IX § 4(C).
220. LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 5, at 10 (see map of Southern Louisiana
highlighting the geography of the dual-claimed lands).
221. LA. CONST. ANN. art. IX § 4(C).
222. See generally LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 5, at 10 (provides a map
of southern Louisiana highlighting the extent of dual-claimed lands).
223. Paragraph (C) states:
The legislature by act may direct the appropriate parish authority in
Terrebonne Parish to transfer title and ownership as to certain lands near
Bayou Dularge in Section 16 of Township 20 South, Range 16 East, 
which due to an error in the original governmental survey completed
around 1838 until recently were thought to be within Section 9, to those
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310 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
amendment would read “may direct the appropriate parish authority to
transfer title and ownership,” allowing for all parishes to fall under the
exception. A broadened approach to the existing exception would give 
every parish with conflicts over dual-claimed lands—including non-
coastal parishes—a means for resolution, or at the very least, guidance for
negotiation.
For coastal landowners, there would also need to be a substantial
change to the statutory law governing private landowner’s mineral rights. 
Louisiana Mineral Code article 5 states that solid minerals, such as coal,
can only be owned by the owner of the land.224 Louisiana Mineral Code
article 6 also prevents landowners from legally severing their mineral
rights by the creation of separate estates in land because the statute
prohibits ownership of fugacious minerals, like oil and gas, as part of the
land.225 Fugacious minerals must be reduced to physical control before one
has a viable property claim for possession or ownership of them.226 
Avoiding the obstacle of these articles would require repealing the statutes
and creating a new one that specifically allows for ownership of all types
of minerals in place, apart from the land itself.227 In many common law
jurisdictions, like North Dakota for example, the creation of separate rights
in land is inherent in statutes that define “freehold estates” or mineral
conveyances.228 These types of statutes are usually based on state
constitutional provisions that permit landowners to create mineral estates.
Moreover, by establishing the rule of separate estates, enacting several
new statutes would likely be required in order to delineate matters such as:
(1) how separate estates can be created; (2) the respective rights of each
owner in those estates; (3) the relation of those estates to one another
persons who have possessed the property under good faith and just title 
for a minimum of ten years or to those who have acquired from them,
reserving the mineral rights as just and sole compensation for the
transfer. Consistent with the provisions of Article XIII, Section 3, the
notice requirements of Article III, Section 13 are satisfied for an act
passed as a companion to the act setting forth this Paragraph.
LA. CONST. ANN. art. IX § 4(C) (the bolded language of this paragraph would
need to be erased so as not to limit the exception to those plots of land listed).
224. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:5 (2019).
225. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:6.
226. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:7; see also LA. REV. STAT. § 31:6.
227. LA. REV. STAT. § 24:176.
228. “As used in this title, unless the context or subject matter requires
otherwise, ‘freeholder’ means the legal title owner of the surface estate in real 
property.” N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 58-01-01.1 (Westlaw 2020); see also OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 802 (Westlaw 2020); see generally CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 
3602.2 (Westlaw 2020).
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3112021] COMMENT
(dominant and servient status); and (4) modes of conveyance and
termination.
The common law system of creating different estates in land to
accommodate separate ownership rights in minerals and the surface
affords each party more freedom in reaching agreements that are tailored
to their specific interests. It has been argued that separate estates simply
grant the parties more options and bargaining ability when negotiating,
which is something the current civilian system does not provide.
For example, in American Lung Association of Louisiana, Inc. v. State
Mineral Board, the private company American Lung originally donated
land to the State for the purpose of building a hospital.229 When the State 
did not do so and instead executed mineral leases, American Lung sued.230 
In the settlement negotiations leading up to trial, the State sought to divide
ownership of the mineral rights in the land with American Lung, but the
Louisiana Supreme Court ruled the settlement was invalid under Louisiana
Constitution article IX section 4 because the State was required to reserve
mineral rights.231 If the common law rules of separate estates were in place,
the settlement could have saved costly time during litigation and both
parties could have reached a mutually advantageous agreement. Moreover,
the litigation might have been avoided altogether if American Lung had
split the land into two estates by selling the surface rights to the State for
the construction of the hospital.
In light of these issues, Louisiana would benefit from adopting some
common law property rules, but at the end of the day, it likely will not.
This is clear from Louisiana’s legislative history.232 The dual-claimed land
controversy has been around since the mid-1800’s.233 Since then,
Louisiana has adopted and ratified eleven constitutions and passed a great
deal of statutory law.234 If Louisiana wanted to convert to common law
property devices to settle dual-claimed land disputes, it likely would have
done so already. Furthermore, Louisiana is firm in its legal practices. In 
contrast to common law, civil law systems simply emphasize different
structural concepts in the holding and disposition of property.235 In
Louisiana, with its simpler land holding system, the introduction of law
229. Am. Lung Ass'n of La., Inc. v. State Mineral Bd., 507 So. 2d 184, 185
(La. 1987).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 190–91.
232. Alain A. Levasseur & Roger K. Ward, 300 Years and Counting: The
French Influence on the Louisiana Legal System, 46 LA. B.J. 301, 304 (1998).
233. LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 5, at 10.
234. Levasseur & Ward, supra note 232, at 304.
235. Martin & Yeates, supra note 113, at 783.
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that sought to challenge the civil law’s Roman roots with feudal common
law “interests” and “estates” was frankly unacceptable from a traditional
standpoint.236 Thus, for these reasons, it might be more attainable to
resolve the legal issues regarding dual-claimed lands under existing
Louisiana law without converting to common law methods.
While Louisiana constitutional law may not allow for severance
explicitly, perhaps it does implicitly. For one, there is a reasonable
alternative viewpoint to the rule in paragraph (A) of Louisiana
Constitution article IX section 4 that requires State reservation of mineral
rights. In terms of the article’s practical application, could not the
reservation of mineral rights be viewed as a form of severance itself?
When land is conveyed by the State to another party, the reservation is
effectively operating as a separate interest in that someone other than the
owner of the property—the State in this scenario—is extensively 
exercising the mineral rights on the land of another. Conceptually, this
arrangement could reasonably be viewed as a “quasi-severance.”
Furthermore, there are other principles within Louisiana statutory law that
suggests there is some space within the property regime that allows for
severance under certain circumstances.237 These considerations comprise 
the type of interpretation, argumentation, and abstract-thinking that one
should experiment with in creating a rule for severance that exists strictly
under Louisiana law.
CONCLUSION
Arriving at a reasonable solution for the controversy surrounding dual-
claimed lands requires a critical evaluation of Louisiana’s current property
law. In doing so, this Comment suggests that substantial changes are likely
236. Id.
237. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1151 (2019); see also LA. REV. STAT. §
41:1702(D)(2)(a)(i) (Under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:1151, riparian
owners may retain mineral rights on land that has changed in ownership as a result
of the sudden actions of rivers, lakes, or the territorial sea so long as existing leases 
are in effect on that land. Additionally, Louisiana Revised Statutes section
41:1702 declares that the State has the right to transfer mineral interests in
emergent land back to the riparian owner if the owner allows the State to perform
restoration projects. This “freeze” statute, in combination with section 41:1702,
illustrates the principle that the legislature has been willing to carve out exceptions
to the prohibition on severance of mineral rights when the rights of landowners
are at risk. A reading in pari materia of the two statutes suggest this point: there
is some wiggle-room within Louisiana’s existing property law for perpetual
alienation of mineral rights by the State or private parties.).
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needed to solve the dual-claimed lands issue. Granting the State and
private landowners the power to sever their mineral rights and create
different estates in land is a serious modification to the civilian property
regime that will likely receive pushback. However, coastal erosion and
deep-seated title conflicts are such significant issues that they warrant the
solutions proposed.
The adoption of common law property concepts would certainly
constitute a fundamental change to Louisiana’s property system that
would require an amendment to the Louisiana Constitution and further
statutory enaction. This solution is justifiable in light of the prevalence of
the controversy. However, justified as it may be, historical evidence of
inaction in the area of creating new law that permits severance, as well as
strong loyalties to our civil tradition, makes it unlikely that Louisiana
would accept the solutions set forth in this Comment. In any event,
resolution to the conflict over dual-claimed lands is likely reliant on some
sort of substantive change to Louisiana’s constitutional and property law
governing ownership rights if practical agreements are to be reached.
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